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Abstract
Orthodox game theory is sometimes criticized for its failure to single
out intuitively compelling solutions in certain types of interpersonal in-
teractions. The theory of team reasoning provides a resolution in some
such cases by suggesting a shift in decision-makers’ mode of reasoning
from individualistic to reasoning as members of a team. The existing
literature in this field discusses a number of properties for a formalized
representation of team’s interests to satisfy: Pareto efficiency, successful
coordination of individuals’ actions and the notion of mutual advantage
among the members of a team. For an explicit function of team’s goals a
reference is sometimes made to the maximization of the average of indi-
viduals’ personal payoffs, which meets the Pareto efficiency and (in many
cases) coordination criteria, but at times fails with respect to the notion of
mutual advantage. It also relies on making interpersonal comparisons of
payoffs which goes beyond the standard assumptions of the expected util-
ity theory that make numerical representations of individuals’ preferences
possible. In this paper we propose an alternative, rank-based function of
team’s interests that does not rely on interpersonal comparisons of pay-
offs, axiomatizes the notion of mutual advantage and satisfies the weak
Pareto efficiency and (in many cases) coordination criteria. We discuss
its predictions using a number of examples and suggest a few possibilities
for further research in this field.
1 Introduction
The standard rational choice theory is sometimes criticized for its inability to
single out what at times appears to be the only obvious choice to make in
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games with multiple Nash equilibria. An example is the simple Hi-Lo game, in
which two players independently and simultaneously choose one from a pair of
available options: Hi or Lo. If both choose Hi , they get a payoff of 2 each. If
both choose Lo, they get a payoff of 1 each. If one chooses Hi while the other
chooses Lo, they both get 0. The game is illustrated in Figure 1, where one of
the players chooses between two options identified by rows and the other—by
columns. The numbers in each cell represent payoffs to the row and the column
players respectively.
Hi Lo
Hi 2, 2 0, 0
Lo 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 1: The Hi-Lo game
The standard theory predicts that rational players will choose strategies that
together constitute a Nash equilibrium, in which each player’s strategy is a best
response to the strategies chosen by all other players. Here this means for both
players to play Hi or for both to play Lo: (Hi , Hi) and (Lo, Lo) are Nash
equilibria1. Yet (Lo, Lo) does not intuitively strike as a rational outcome in
this game. It is true that if one player expected the other to play Lo, then
choosing Lo would be his or her best response to the other player’s choice. In
other words, choosing Lo would be the rational thing to do. However, it would
be odd if anyone formed an expectation that a rational individual would play
Lo in the first place. Experimental results support this by revealing that over
90% of the time people do opt for Hi in this game.2
This prompted the emergence of the theory of team reasoning which sug-
gests that certain features of the context in which interdependent decisions are
made may trigger a shift in peoples’ mode of reasoning from individualistic
best-response reasoning to reasoning as members of a team where a group of
individuals act together in the attainment of some common goal.3 By identify-
ing this goal with the maximization of the average of decision-makers’ personal
payoffs the theory can be operationalized to render Hi to be the only ratio-
nal choice in the Hi-Lo game for anyone who reasons as a member of a team.
1These are Nash equilibria in pure strategies. There is a third equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies, in which players randomize between the two available options with certain probabilities.
Here and in the rest of this paper we focus solely on equilibria in pure strategies.
2See Bardsley et al. (2010) who, among a number of other games, report experimental
results from two versions of the Hi-Lo game where the outcome (Hi , Hi) yields a payoff of 10
while the outcome (Lo, Lo) yields a payoff of 9 or 1 to both players.
3For early developments of this theory see Sugden (1993, 2000, 2003) and Bacharach (1999,
2006). For some of the more recent work see Gold and Sugden (2007a,b), Sugden (2011, 2015)
and Gold (2012).
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Similarly, this allows to explain cooperation in the widely discussed Prisoner’s
Dilemma and the Stag Hunt games.
While we agree with the idea that peoples’ mode of reasoning may sometimes
undergo a shift from individualistic to reasoning as members of a team, we
criticize the identification of the team’s interests with the maximization of the
average of individuals’ personal payoffs. We do this for two reasons. First, it
relies on making interpersonal comparisons of individual players’ payoffs, which
goes beyond the standard assumptions of the expected utility theory. Second,
it may advocate a complete self-sacrifice of some individuals for the benefit
of others or possibly one sole member of a team. In this paper we present
an alternative function for representing team’s interests that does not rely on
making interpersonal comparisons of payoffs and makes participation in team
play conditional on it bringing about at least some benefit to every member of
the team.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss
the theory of team reasoning in more detail and present how it is sometimes
operationalized to render Hi to be the only rational choice in the Hi-Lo game
and to explain cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag Hunt games.
We also explain that the notion of team reasoning cannot be represented by a
transformation of individuals’ personal payoffs in games. In section 3 we discuss
why the maximization of the average of individuals’ personal payoffs may not be
a good representation of team’s interests. In section 4 we present an alternative
rank-based function4 and illustrate its predictions using a variety of examples.
With section 5 we conclude and suggest a few possible directions for further
research.
2 Team Reasoning
When a person reasons individualistically, he or she focuses on the question
“what it is that I should do in order to best promote my interests?”. The answer
to this question identifies a strategy that is associated with the highest expected
personal payoff to the individual , given his or her beliefs about the actions
of others. This is what is meant by individualistic best-response reasoning
underlying the identification of Nash equilibria in games. When a person reasons
as a member of a team, he or she focuses on the question “what it is that
we should do in order to best promote our interests?”. The answer to this
question identifies a set of strategies—one strategy for each of the interacting
individuals5—that leads to the attainment of the best possible outcome for the
4By function we mean something similar to what the rational choice theory refers to as a
choice function that takes the set of the available actions to an individual, the structure of
a game and the individual’s beliefs about others’ behaviour as inputs and produces a set of
(rational) actions as an output. A slight difference in the case discussed in this paper is that
the output of the function is a set of (rational) outcomes rather than actions.
5Strictly speaking this need not necessarily be the case, since not all individuals in a given
strategic interaction may be reasoning as members of a team. There are variants of the theory
of team reasoning that consider such scenarios. For an overview see Gold and Sugden (2007a).
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group of individuals acting together as a team. As explained by Gold and Sugden
(2007a) ‘when an individual reasons as a member of a team, she considers which
combination of actions by members of the team would best promote the team’s
objective, and then performs her part of that combination’.
In the existing literature on the theory of team reasoning that attempts to
propose an explicit function for representing the interests of a team a reference
is sometimes made to the maximization of the average of individuals’ personal
payoffs. This suggestion can be found in Bacharach (1999, 2006) and, in later
theoretical developments, it was made by Smerilli (2012). In empirical studies
it was adopted by Colman et al. (2008, 2014). It is not the case that every-
body operationalizes the theory of team reasoning using this function. Sugden
(1993, 2000, 2003) as well as Gold and Sugden (2007a,b) do not endorse any
explicit function and Gold (2012) suggests that team’s interests do not have to
be represented by the maximization of average payoffs. Crawford et al. (2008)
and Bardsley et al. (2010) interpret team reasoning as a search for a decision
rule that would resolve certain types of coordination problems in a mutually
beneficial way, but do not propose a specific function as well. Sugden (2011,
2015) suggests that a function representing team’s interests should incorporate
the notion of mutual advantage among the members of a team and proposes a
way of identifying mutually advantageous possibilities in games. We adopt the
latter idea and expand it by axiomatizing mutually advantageous play in our
construction of the rank-based function of team’s interests in section 4 below.
With the exception of Sugden’s proposal to incorporate the notion of mutual
benefit in formal representations of team’s interests, however, the literature on
the theory of team reasoning that is known to us has not yet presented a formal
alternative to the maximization of average payoffs as an explicit representation
of team’s goals.
One reason why the maximization of the average of individuals’ payoffs is
attractive is that it ensures Pareto efficiency6 of any outcome that is selected
by a team. It is easy to see that the outcome that best promotes this objective
in the Hi-Lo game is (Hi , Hi). Thus, when an individual reasons as a member
of a team, he or she identifies the outcome (Hi , Hi) as uniquely optimal for
the team and individually chooses Hi—his or her part in the attainment of this
outcome.
Consider now the Prisoner’s Dilemma game illustrated in Figure 2A, in which
two players independently and simultaneously decide whether to cooperate (play
C ) or defect (play D). The game has a unique Nash equilibrium: (D , D). This
is because, irrespective of what the other player is going to do, it is always
better to play D from an individual’s personal point of view. Individualistic
reasoning, thus, leads to a socially suboptimal, Pareto inefficient outcome, since
the outcome (D , D) yields lower payoffs to both players than does the outcome
(C , C ). This is the main reason why this game is so widely discussed in social
6An outcome of a game is Pareto efficient if there exists no other outcome in which some-
body’s payoff could be increased without making anyone else worse off. In the Hi-Lo game
the outcome (Lo, Lo) is Pareto inefficient since both players are better off in the outcome (Hi ,
Hi), which is the only Pareto efficient outcome in this game.
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sciences.
C D
C 2, 2 0, 3
D 3, 0 1, 1
A
S H
S 2, 2 0, 1
H 1, 0 1, 1
B
Figure 2: The Prisoner’s Dilemma (A) and the Stag Hunt (B) games
Experimental results suggest that in a one-shot version of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game (i.e. when it is played once) people tend to cooperate about
50% of the time.7 Notice that the outcome (C , C ) uniquely maximizes the
average of individuals’ personal payoffs. As such, the theory of team reasoning
operationalized using the maximization of average payoffs suggests that in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game some people reason as members of a team while others
reason individualistically.
In a similar way the theory can explain cooperation in the Stag Hunt game
illustrated in Figure 2B. This game has two Nash equilibria: (S ,S ) and (H ,H ).
However, hunting hare (playing H ) guarantees a payoff of 1 irrespective of what
the other player does, whereas the attainment of the high payoff from hunting
stag (playing S ) crucially depends on the cooperation of the other party. Here
experimental results suggest that in a one-shot version of this game people tend
to choose S slightly more than 60% of the time.8 We will discuss this result in
more detail in section 4.
2.1 Team Reasoning vs. Transformation of Personal Pay-
offs
An important point stressed by many game theorists is that payoff structures
of games have to fully capture everything that is motivationally important in
individuals’ evaluations of the possible outcomes of those games. For example,
imagine that two people are playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in terms of
monetary payoffs as illustrated in Figure 3A. Suppose that the row player is a
pure altruist when it comes to decisions involving money—i.e. he or she always
7Cooperation tends to decrease with repetition, however (i.e. when people play the same
game a number of times). See Ledyard (1995) for a survey of experimental results from public
goods games, which involve more than two players but otherwise are very similar in their
structure to the two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma.
8The proportion of people choosing S changes with repetition: in some cases it increases
while in others it decreases. This seems to, at least partially, depend on the specific payoff
structure of the played Stag Hunt game—the extent of risk involved in playing S and the
extent of risklessness in playing H . See Battalio et al. (2001).
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wants to maximize the other player’s monetary gain. Suppose also that the
column player prefers to maximize his or her personal monetary payoff, but is
extremely averse to inequitable distributions of gains among individuals. As-
sume that an outcome resulting in unequal monetary gains for the two players
is just as good for him or her as gaining nothing. The correct representation
of the true motivations of these individuals transforms the monetary Prisoner’s
Dilemma game into the game illustrated in Figure 3B. This transformed game
has a unique Nash equilibrium (C ,C ) in which both players rationally cooper-
ate following individualistic best-response reasoning in the attainment of their
personal goals.
C D
C £2, £2 £0, £3
D £3, £0 £1, £1
A
C D
C 2, 2 3, 0
D 0, 0 1, 1
B
Figure 3: The Prisoner’s Dilemma game in terms of £ (A) and its transformation
using payoffs that represent the true motivations of both players (B)
We agree with the idea that payoff structures of games have to accurately
capture the true motivations of interacting individuals. It is important to note,
however, that a possible shift in a decision-maker’s mode of reasoning from in-
dividualistic to reasoning as a member of a team cannot be captured by a trans-
formation of that individual’s personal payoffs in the same way as it was done
in the case of altruism and inequity-aversion above. To see this consider again
the Hi-Lo game illustrated in Figure 1. Suppose that the row player reasons as
a member of a team and adopts the maximization of the average of individuals’
personal payoffs as the team’s objective. Replacing his or her personal payoff
numbers with averages of the two players’ payoffs in each outcome does not
transform the original Hi-Lo game into anything different. This is because the
personal payoffs of the two players already match the average of their personal
payoffs in each outcome of this game to begin with. As a result, the transformed
game would still have two Nash equilibria and two rational outcomes—exactly
what the theory of team reasoning was developed to contest.
The difference between an individualistic mode of reasoning and reasoning
as a member of a team lies not in how an individual personally values each
outcome of a game, but in the way he or she reasons when choosing among the
available actions. When a person reasons individualistically, he or she chooses an
action based on his or her belief about what the other player is going to do and
which outcome—and personal payoff—the chosen action would subsequently
yield. When a person reasons as a member of a team, on the other hand,
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he or she first identifies an outcome of the game that best fulfills the team’s
objective and then performs his or her part in the attainment of that outcome.
In other words, somebody who reasons individualistically chooses an action that
maximizes his or her expected personal payoff, whereas somebody who reasons
as a member of a team chooses an action that is associated with an outcome
that best fulfills the team’s objective.
This underlines two key assumptions on which our approach is based. First,
we assume that individuals’ personal payoffs represent their true motivations in
games. Second, we assume that the payoff structures of games are commonly
known by all the interacting decision-makers. The latter point rules out the
possibility that a mere shift in an individual’s mode of reasoning—in addition to
changing the way that individual reasons—changes the way he or she personally
values each outcome in the considered games. If that were not the case, these
interactions would cease to be games of complete information about each other’s
payoffs and would take us further away from orthodox game theory and the type
of games we analyze in this paper.
Another important point to note is that reasoning as a member of a team
does not imply and is not implied by the sharing of the attained payoffs among
the members of a team. In other words, the attained payoffs are not transferable
from one player to another. If players are able to (or are going to) share their
personal gains, this has to be reflected in the payoff structures of the played
games to begin with in order to correctly capture the players’ true motivations.
In this light, equal sharing of combined payoffs in the Hi-Lo game would leave
the payoff structure of the original game unchanged. It would, however, change
the payoff structure of any game that contained outcomes yielding unequal dis-
tributions of payoffs among players (as is the case, for example, in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma and the Stag Hunt games).
2.2 Team Reasoning and the Team’s Interests: Two Sep-
arate Questions
The theory of team reasoning, as introduced above, has to answer two separate
but equally important questions. First, it needs to specify clear and testable
circumstances under which individuals’ mode of reasoning may undergo a shift
from individualistic to reasoning as members of a team. Second, in cases when
individuals do reason as members of a team, it needs to specify what they take
the team’s interests to be upon deciding on what courses of action to take. In
this paper we predominantly focus on the latter question and turn to it next.
3 Team’s Interests: Not the Average of Per-
sonal Payoffs
As mentioned in the previous section, the literature on the theory of team rea-
soning that attempts to propose an explicit function for representing the inter-
ests of a team sometimes refers to the maximization of the average of individual
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decision-makers’ personal payoffs. We criticize this suggestion and believe that,
if people do reason as members of a team in certain situations, they are unlikely
to adopt the maximization of average payoffs as a guide when thinking about
what it is that they should do. Our criticism is based on two points.
First, the maximization of the average of personal payoffs may, in certain
situations, advocate a complete sacrifice of some individuals’ personal inter-
ests for the benefit of others or possibly one sole member of a team—a con-
sequence which we believe to be intuitively problematic. To see this, consider
a slightly amended version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game illustrated in Fig-
ure 4A. The only difference from its original version is the slightly higher payoff
to the row player from defection when the column player cooperates. In this
game, the maximization of the average of players’ personal payoffs would iden-
tify the team’s objective with the attainment of the outcome (D ,C ). It would
thus prescribe a complete sacrifice of the column player’s personal interests with
the row player reaping all the benefits from team play.
C D
C 2, 2 0, 3
D 5, 0 1, 1
A
L R
U 10, 1 0, 0
D 4, 4 1, 9
B
Figure 4: The amended Prisoner’s Dilemma (A) and the Chicken (B) games
For a slightly different example consider the game illustrated in Figure 4B,
which is a particular version of the game known as the Chicken. This game
has two Nash equilibria: (U ,L) and (D ,R). Here the maximization of average
payoffs suggests that team’s interests would be best fulfilled with the attainment
of the outcome (U ,L). In this case it does not prescribe a complete self-sacrifice
to the column player—the outcome (U ,L) is not the worst possible outcome for
him or her in this game—but it does not advance the column player’s personal
interests anywhere far from just that.
Our suggestion is that, if some people’s mode of reasoning does undergo a
shift from individualistic to reasoning as members of a team in the amended
Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Chicken games above, the team’s objective would
be the attainment of the outcomes (C ,C ) and (D ,L) respectively. More im-
portantly, we suggest that no individual would willingly subscribe to team play
if there was no personal gain for him or her from doing so, which precludes
the possibility of a self-sacrifice. Our intuition is shared by Sugden (2015) who
suggests that, in team play, ‘each [player is] choosing his or her component of
the joint action with the intention of achieving mutual benefit’.
This is not to say that self-sacrifice does not exist. It is evident that we
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are often willing to sacrifice our personal material gains for the well-being of
our loved ones. We suggest, however, that such motivational factors need to
be fully captured by individuals’ personal payoffs associated with the possible
outcomes in games before the different modes of reasoning are considered. And,
if team reasoning is a mode of reasoning that individual decision-makers may
adopt in one-shot interactions with potentially complete strangers—cases that
we consider in this paper—then self-sacrifice of individuals is unlikely.
The essence of this argument rests on an idea somewhat similar to the no-
tion of the separateness of persons used to criticize utilitarianism. Utilitarian-
ism, which focuses on the maximization of the aggregate well-being of a society
while ignoring the distribution of the attained well-being among the individual
members of that society, is said to be insufficiently sensitive to the separateness
of individuals and the advancement of their personal well-being. In a similar
fashion it can be argued that any aggregative function of team’s interests that
fails to take into account the distribution of payoffs among the members of a
team is susceptible to being rejected for failing to respect the separateness of
the interacting players. So long as there is space to make an objection on such
grounds, any individual decision-maker could reasonably refuse taking part in
the prescribed team play when their personal gains from doing so are insuffi-
ciently addressed.9
An important implication of the first point of our criticism is that we remain
committed to the idea that all that matters for individual decision-makers are
their personal motivations in the considered games. In this sense, the use of
the term “team” in the interpretation of the theory of team reasoning in this
paper is meant to be very loose. Most importantly, it is not meant to carry
any psychological connotations that may be present in various other interpre-
tations of team work and team members’ duties (e.g. in sport, work groups,
neighbourhoods or faculties) which may lead to individuals’ abandonment of
their personal aspirations (even when these aspirations take into account the
well-being of others). In certain types of interpersonal interactions, however,
the decision-makers’ personal interests may be advanced further relative to out-
comes that would be attained if everyone followed individualistic best-response
reasoning. This advancement of personal interests is made possible—as we will
attempt to show in the next section—by a shift in the decision-makers’ mode
of reasoning from individualistic to reasoning as members of a team.
The second point of our criticism is based on the fact that the use of the
average function relies on making interpersonal comparisons of the interacting
individuals’ payoffs. However, the standard assumptions of the expected utility
theory that make numerical representations of individuals’ motivations possi-
ble by themselves do not allow such comparisons to be made.10 To illustrate
what this means, consider again the Prisoner’s Dilemma game presented in
9See Rawls (1971) and Nozick (1974) for criticism of utilitarianism. Although we use an
analogy to their notion of the separateness of persons, our claim here is not based on grounds
of moral normativity.
10In the literature on the theory of team reasoning this has also been pointed out by Sugden
(2000).
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Figures 2(A) and 3(A). The numerical representation of the row player’s prefer-
ences allows us to say that he or she prefers the outcome (C ,C ) to the outcome
(D ,D). It also allows us to say that he or she prefers the outcome (C ,C ) to the
outcome (C ,D) by a greater extent than he or she prefers the outcome (D ,C ) to
the outcome (C ,C ). However, it does not allow us to claim that the row player
“enjoys” the benefits of the outcome (C ,C ) by as much as does the column
player.
Although in this paper we do not discuss the technical arguments of why it
is so, any payoff function that numerically represents a decision-maker’s pref-
erences or motivations is unique only up to positive affine transformations.11
What follows from this is that the payoff structure of the game illustrated in
Figure 5(B) represents exactly the same motivations of the interacting individ-
uals as the one in Figure 5(A).
C D
C 2, 2 0, 3
D 3, 0 1, 1
A
C D
C 6, 3 0, 4
D 9, 1 3, 2
B
Figure 5: The original Prisoner’s Dilemma game (A) and its representation using
positive affine transformations12 of the row and the column players’ payoffs (B)
If the theory of team reasoning makes use of an aggregative payoff function
to represent the interests of a team—such as the maximization of the average or
the sum of individuals’ personal payoffs—it ceases to be a mere extension of the
framework used by the standard rational choice theory and needs to suggest how
the required interpersonal comparisons of payoffs are possible. An alternative
is to drop the idea that team’s goals are best represented by such aggregative
functions and in the next section we propose a representation of team’s interests
based on the latter approach. To put this point differently, we hope to show
that team play is possible in certain types of interpersonal interactions even
without invoking interpersonal comparisons of the interacting players’ payoffs.
11This means that if u is a payoff function representing an individual’s personal motivations,
then so is function u′ = au + c where a > 0 and c are constants. For a detailed discussion of
why this is so see, for example, Luce and Raiffa (1957, ch. 2).
12The column player’s payoffs in Figure 5(B) were transformed by adding 1 to every number
representing his or her payoffs in the original representation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
in Figure 5(A) while the row player’s payoffs were transformed by multiplying each number
by a factor of 3.
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4 Team’s Interests: A Rank-Based Function
In this section we propose a representation of team’s interests that fits with our
intuition about a set of conditions that have to be satisfied in order for individual
decision-makers to take part in team play. We start with the proposition of two
properties for a candidate function of team’s interests to have:
1. A team’s objective has to be the attainment of an outcome that is bene-
ficial to every member of the team.
2. Decision-makers’ payoffs are not interpersonally comparable, but each in-
dividual’s complete preferential ranking of the possible outcomes of a game
is commonly known by all players. The derivation of a team’s objective
should be done without invoking interpersonal comparisons of players’
payoffs.
The first property captures the idea that there has to be something “in it”
for a potential member of a team from team play in order for that individual to
participate in the attainment of the team’s goal. As mentioned earlier, we share
the intuition behind this property with Sugden (2011, 2015) who suggests that
team play has to be recognized as being mutually advantageous by all those
partaking in it. Of course, we will need to define what it means for something
to be regarded as mutually advantageous as well as how and relative to what
that advantage is measured. The second property is a corollary of the standard
assumption of non-cooperative game in games of complete information: the
common knowledge about the interacting players’ payoffs. It is also in line
with the standard axioms of rationality that make numerical representations
of decision-makers’ preferences possible but do not entail their interpersonal
comparability.
With these properties in mind, we suggest a team’s objective to be the max-
imal advancement of mutual benefit to the members of the team. As we will
show shortly, our proposed function of team’s interests can be operationalized
using two types of unit by which the extent of individual and mutual advantage
is measured. The choice of unit depends on the type of information conveyed
by the payoff structures of games about the interacting decision-makers’ prefer-
ences. We start with the case where players’ personal payoff numbers represent
merely ordinal preferential rankings of the available outcomes in games. Fol-
lowing this we discuss a scenario in which relative payoff intervals associated
with different pairs of outcomes convey meaningful information about players’
relative preferential intensities. In decision-theoretic language, the former refers
to ordinal and the latter to cardinal representations of players’ preferences.
There are two ways to motivate our proposed function of team’s interests.
One is axiomatic that presents a set of more fine-grained properties for a function
of team’s interests to satisfy. The other describes a plausible reasoning process
that rational decision-makers may engage in when facing particular types of
games. We start with the axiomatic approach first by proposing four axioms to
characterize the interests of a team. We will describe a reasoning process that
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is in line with these axioms when discussing a number of examples later in this
section.
Axiom 1 (Weak Pareto optimality): If an outcome y of a game is strictly
preferred to some other outcome x by all players, then the outcome x is not
chosen by the team.
This axiom ensures Pareto efficiency of the selected outcome in a weak sense13.
We believe this to be an essential feature of any candidate function for repre-
senting team’s interests. Since team-reasoning individuals evaluate all outcomes
of a game and identify a subset of these as best for a team, it would be odd if
they picked an outcome that, from every player’s personal point of view, was
worse than some other available alternative.14
Before presenting the second axiom we need to introduce a few additional
terms. Let the smallest personal payoff that a player can attain from choosing
a particular strategy in a game be called that player’s personal security payoff
associated with the strategy in question. Recall the Stag Hunt game illustrated
in Figure 2(B). The personal security payoff associated with hunting stag for
either player is 0, since it is the minimal personal payoff that can be attained
by playing S. Similarly, the personal security payoff associated with hunting
hare (playing H) for either player is 1. Given this and any game, a player can
always choose a strategy associated with the highest personal security payoff.
This guarantees the player the attainment of a payoff that is at least as high as
the security payoff in question, irrespective of what the other players are going
to do. In the case of the Stag Hunt game, the maximal payoff that any player
can guarantee him or her self in this way is 1, which is the personal security
payoff associated with hunting hare. This is usually referred to as the player’s
personal maximin payoff level in the game and the corresponding strategy—the
maximin strategy.
Axiom 2 (Preservation of personal security): Team play cannot leave any
player worse-off than his or her personal maximin payoff level in a game.
This axiom limits a team’s objective to the attainment of only those outcomes
that result in players’ personal payoffs being at least as high as the payoffs that
they could secure themselves by playing their maximin strategies individually.
As such, it defines the lower threshold points in games, below which potential
members of a team would, so to speak, not “agree to go” in team play, since they
can guarantee themselves a better personal payoff individually. Sugden (2015)
uses the same lower threshold point in defining mutually advantageous team
13An outcome of a game is Pareto efficient in a weak sense if there exists no other outcome
in which every player is better off in terms of their personal payoffs. The set of Pareto efficient
outcomes in a weak sense is a subset of all Pareto efficient outcomes, since the latter requires
there to be no other outcome in which somebody’s payoff could be increased without making
anyone else worse off.
14Bardsley et al. (2010) consider possible cases where the Pareto criterion may be abandoned
in team play. We will briefly return to this in more detail in section 5.
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play. (Our approach differs from Sugden’s through the imposition of the weak
Pareto criterion discussed above. We also extend the notion of mutual benefit by
proposing a measure of the extent of individual and mutual advantage presented
by different outcomes to the interacting decision-makers, discussed next.)
We now turn to defining individual and mutual advantage and the way these
are measured. To do this we introduce the following method for assigning pref-
erential rank values to the available outcomes in games based on each player’s
personal preferential ordering of those outcomes. For a particular player, the
least preferred outcome in a game is assigned the preferential rank value 0. The
second least preferred outcome is assigned the preferential rank value 1 and
so on. A shift from one outcome to another that results in an increase of the
assigned preferential rank value by 1 for some player is said to advance that
player’s personal interests by 1 unit and, more generally, an increase of the
assigned preferential rank value by k is said to advance that player’s personal
interests by k units.
Individual advantage: An outcome of a game is individually advantageous to
a particular player if that player preferentially ranks this outcome above
the outcome(s) associated with his or her personal maximin payoff level in
the game. The extent of individual advantage provided by an outcome to
a particular player is given by the number of units this outcome advances
that player’s personal interests relative to the outcome(s) associated with
his or her personal maximin payoff level in the game.
Mutual advantage: An outcome of a game is mutually advantageous to the
interacting players if each player preferentially ranks this outcome above
the outcome(s) associated with his or her personal maximin payoff level
in the game. The extent of mutual advantage provided by an outcome
to the interacting decision-makers is given by the number of units this
outcome advances all players’ personal interests in parallel relative to the
outcome(s) associated with each player’s personal maximin payoff level in
the game.
For an example imagine a two-player game where some outcome x advances
the first and the second player’s personal interests relative to the outcomes
associated with their personal maximin payoff levels in the game by 1 and
2 units respectively. Since this outcome advances the two players’ personal
interests in parallel by 1 unit, it is said to provide 1 unit of mutual advantage
to the interacting decision-makers. The additional unit of advancement of the
second player’s personal interests provided by this outcome represents individual
advantage to the second player over and above the 1 unit of mutual advantage.
We will illustrate this with a number of more concrete examples later in this
section.
Axiom 3 (Maximal mutual advantage): An outcome selected by a team
has to be maximally mutually advantageous.
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This axiom has two implications. First, if a game contains a mutually ad-
vantageous outcome, then any outcome that is selected by a team must also
be mutually advantageous. Second, if a game contains multiple mutually ad-
vantageous outcomes, then the outcome(s) selected by the team must provide
maximal mutual advantage. In other words, if there is an outcome that provides
more mutual benefit to the interacting decision-makers than some outcome x,
then x is not chosen by the team.
Given the three axioms above we propose the following function to represent
the interests of a team.
Rank-based function of team’s interests: Maximize the minimum number
of units by which individuals’ personal interests are advanced among
the interacting players relative to each player’s threshold point—the out-
come(s) associated with his or her maximin payoff level in the game.
It can be shown that this function satisfies the three axioms introduced earlier
(for proofs see Appendix A). It is not, however, the only function that does
so. Consider a two-player game where a particular outcome x advances each
of the two players’ personal interests by 2 units while some other outcome y
advances the first and the second player’s personal interests by 2 and 3 units
respectively. The extent of mutual advantage provided by either of the two
outcomes is the same—2 units. Assuming there to be no outcomes providing
a higher extent of mutual advantage in this game, the rank-based function
of team’s interests selects both x and y. As such, any function that would
further discriminate between these two outcomes would also satisfy the three
axioms introduced above. However, any such additional discrimination would
go beyond the notion of mere maximization of the extent of mutual advantage
attained by the interacting players. We therefore believe that the proposed
function best captures the interacting individuals’ primary motivation to satisfy
their personal preferences in a mutually beneficial way without invoking any
additional motivational attitudes, such as benevolence towards others in team
play. We formalize the latter idea using Axiom 4 below.
Axiom 4 (Indifference between equal extent of mutual advantage): If
some outcome x is in a team’s choice set15 and some other outcome y provides
the same extent of mutual advantage as x, then y is in the team’s choice set as
well.
This says that all that matters in determining the optimal outcomes for a team
is the extent of mutual advantage that those outcomes provide to the interacting
individuals. This axiom ensures uniqueness of the proposed function of team’s
interests (for proof see Appendix B).
There is a connection between the above function of team’s interests and the
idea of rational cooperation discussed by Gauthier (2013). For Gauthier, ratio-
nal cooperation is the attainment of Pareto efficiency through the maximization
15To say that an outcome is in a team’s choice set means the same as to say that it is
selected as one of the optimal outcomes for the team.
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of the minimum level of individual benefit across individuals similar to the max-
imin principle in mutually advantageous team play described above. Although
Gauthier mentions relative threshold points, below which decision-makers would
refuse to cooperate, he does not provide a clear characterization of what those
threshold points are and how they are derived. Also, Gauthier’s justification of
the proposed function of rational cooperation (the idea of maximin proportion-
ate gain in his text) is not entirely clear and the axiomatic approach presented
here is a possible way for filling these gaps.
4.1 Formalization
Let Γ be a normal form game defined as a triple (I, Si, ui) where I = {1, 2, . . . ,m}
is a finite set of m players, Si is a set of pure strategies available to player i ∈ I,
and ui(s) is a payoff function that assigns to every player i ∈ I a personal payoff
for each outcome in the game. An outcome of a game is defined as a strategy
profile s = (s1, . . . , sm) where si ∈ Si is a particular pure strategy chosen by
player i ∈ I. Let Σ be the set of all possible strategy profiles (i.e. outcomes) in
the game Γ and sYi ∈ Σ be a strategy profile that is associated with player i’s
maximin payoff level in the game.
Each player i ∈ I has a personal preferential ranking of all the strategy
profiles in the set Σ. Let {x ∈ Z∗ | x ≤ k} be a set of non-negative integers
from 0 to k where k ≤ n − 1 and n is the total number of strategy profiles
available in the game Γ . Let ℘i : Σ → {x ∈ Z∗ | x ≤ k} be a ranking function
that, for each player i ∈ I, assigns a personal preferential rank value to each
strategy profile in the set Σ as follows: the strategy profile that player i ∈ I
prefers the least in the game Γ is assigned the preferential rank value 0, the
second least preferred strategy profile is assigned the preferential rank value 1
and so on.
The rank-based function of team’s interests Fτ : P(Σ) → P(Σ), where
Fτ (Σ) = Στ and Στ ⊆ Σ, is a choice function that selects a subset from
the set of all possible strategy profiles of the game Γ such that each selected
strategy profile maximizes the minimum difference, across all players, between
the preferential rank value of the selected profile and the preferential rank value
of the strategy profile associated with a particular player’s personal maximin
payoff level in the game. In other words, each element sτ ∈ Στ is such that
sτ ∈ arg max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]} :=
{sτ | ∀s ∈ Σ : min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
] ≤ min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
τ )− ℘i(sYi)
]}
4.2 Payoff Intervals in Individual and Mutual Advantage
The operationalization of the rank-based function of team’s interests presented
thus far is based on the interacting players’ ordinal preferential rankings of out-
comes in games and it ignores the relative preferential intensities in the players’
pairwise comparisons of those outcomes. Suppose a player prefers some outcome
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x to the outcome y and the outcome y to the outcome z. The operationalization
of the function presented above considers the player’s preferential ranking of the
three outcomes, but ignores the information on whether the player prefers x to
y by a greater, lesser or the same extent as he or she prefers y to z. The stan-
dard axioms of rationality, however, make the ratios of payoff intervals between
different pairs of outcomes to be meaningful representations of decision-makers’
relative preferential intensities. We now present a slight modification of the
above approach that takes the information about such preferential intensities
into account.
We introduce the following modification for determining the number of units
by which a shift from one outcome to another is said to advance a particular
player’s personal interests. First, each player’s personal payoffs associated with
the available outcomes in games are normalized to assign the least preferred
outcome the payoff value of 0 and the most preferred outcome the payoff value
of 100. This is done by applying an appropriate positive affine transformation
of personal payoffs. For example, if a particular player’s preferences over four
outcomes in a game are represented by payoff values 0, 1, 2 and 3, the nor-
malization transforms these into 0, 33 13 , 66
2
3 and 100 respectively. After this
normalization, a shift from one outcome to another that results in an increase
in the assigned normalized personal payoff value of 1 for some player is said to
advance that player’s personal interests by 1 unit. Apart from this modification,
the three axioms introduced earlier, the definitions of individual and mutual ad-
vantage and the description of the rank-based function of team’s interests all
remain unchanged.
In the formal representation of the modified approach Γ is a normal form
game defined as a triple (I, Si, u
∗
i ) where u
∗
i (s) is a normalized payoff function
that assigns to every player i ∈ I a personal payoff for each outcome in the game
in a way that the least and the most preferred outcomes are given the values 0
and 100 respectively. Each element sτ ∈ Στ is now such that
sτ ∈ arg max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
u∗i (s)− u∗i (sYi)
]} :=
{sτ | ∀s ∈ Σ : min
i∈I
[
u∗i (s)− u∗i (sYi)
] ≤ min
i∈I
[
u∗i (s
τ )− u∗i (sYi)
]}
4.3 Examples
We now turn to discussing a number of examples. First, we apply the function
of team’s interests to four well known two-player games with multiple Nash
equilibria. We then revisit the Prisoner’s Dilemma—a case involving a unique
Nash equilibrium. Since the prescriptions of the rank-based function are the
same for both types of unit used to measure the extent of individual and mutual
advantage in all these cases, we will focus solely on the ordinal representations
of players’ preferences where the unit in question is the preferential rank value
described on page 13. We will end this section by presenting an example where
prescriptions of the rank-based function diverge for the two types of unit—the
preferential rank value and the normalized payoff.
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4.3.1 The Hi-Lo
Recall the Hi-Lo game illustrated in Figure 1. The row and the column play-
ers’ personal preferential rankings of the four outcomes are shown below with
numbers representing the corresponding preferential rank values and arrows in-
dicating outcomes associated with each player’s maximin payoff level in the
game.
Row player:
 (Hi,Hi) 2(Lo, Lo) 1
⇒ (Hi, Lo)(Lo,Hi) 0
 Column player:
 (Hi,Hi) 2(Lo, Lo) 1
⇒ (Hi, Lo)(Lo,Hi) 0

Relative to the maximin payoff level, the outcome (Hi , Hi) advances each
player’s personal interests by 2 units. The outcome (Lo, Lo) does so by 1 unit.
Hence, the rank-based function of team’s interests identifies (Hi , Hi) as the best
outcome for a team and its attainment as the team’s objective. As a result, for
any individual who reasons as a member of a team, (Hi , Hi) is the only rational
outcome in this game.
A plausible reasoning process by which individual players may arrive at this
conclusion can be described as follows. Having worked out all the best-response
strategies in this game, individualistically reasoning decision-makers face a Nash
equilibrium selection problem. This leaves them stuck with no further indication
of what actions they ought to perform independently from each other in order
to best promote their personal interests. The next question they ask themselves
is “what would be best for both of us in this situation?”. As soon as they do so,
they start reasoning as members of a team and identify the uniquely rational
outcome from the perspective of team’s interests.
According to the deliberative process just described, the adoption of the
team mode of reasoning comes about as a result of extensive thinking about the
game by otherwise individualistically rational agents who are able to work out
each other’s best-response strategies and realize that these leave them with a
Nash equilibrium selection problem. As such, it uses as its starting point the
standard assumption of orthodox game theory that the basic mode of reasoning
used by the interacting decision-makers is individualistic best-responding.16
4.3.2 The Stag Hunt
Recall the Stag Hunt game illustrated in Figure 2(B). The row and the column
players’ preferential rankings of outcomes are shown below.
Row player:
 (S, S) 2⇒ (H,S)(H,H) 1
(S,H) 0
 Column player:
 (S, S) 2⇒ (S,H)(H,H) 1
(H,S) 0

Since either player can obtain a payoff of 1 by hunting hare (playing H ) ir-
respective of what the other player is going to do, the personal maximin payoff
16For other possible suggestions of what may trigger shifts in individuals’ mode of reasoning,
some of which abandon this assumption, see, for example, Bacharach (2006), Sugden (2003)
or Gold and Sugden (2007a,b).
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level is associated with the pair of outcomes (H , S ) and (H , H ) for the row,
and (S , H ) and (H , H ) for the column players. Since (S , S ) is the only mu-
tually advantageous outcome relative to these threshold points, the rank-based
function of team’s interests identifies it as the uniquely rational solution of the
game for players who reason as members of a team.
With regards to this game in particular, it is important to mention other
solution concepts to the Nash equilibrium selection problem that are based on
risk or uncertainty aversion with respect to choosing a particular action. Notice
that in the Stag Hunt game it can be argued that the Nash equilibrium (H ,
H ) is in some sense safer than the equilibrium (S , S ). This is because either
player is guaranteed a certain payoff from hunting hare (playing H ) whereas
the high payoff from hunting stag (playing S ) crucially depends on the other
player’s choice. While we don’t review the various models of risk and uncertainty
aversion in this paper (some of which are based on probabilistic assessments of
players’ actions while others on the sizes of foregone payoffs in cases of devia-
tions from equilibrium play) we do believe that these considerations may play a
role in determining the likelihood of individuals’ adoption of the team mode of
reasoning. However, since existing experimental data suggests that in one-shot
interactions people tend to play S slightly more than 60% of the time, we do
suggest that a shift in individuals’ mode of reasoning to that as members of a
team in one-shot versions of this game is likely.17
4.3.3 The Chicken
Recall the Chicken game illustrated in Figure 4(B). The row and the column
players’ preferential rankings of outcomes are shown below.
Row player:

(U,L) 3
(D,L) 2
⇒ (D,R) 1
(U,R) 0
 Column player:

(D,R) 3
(D,L) 2
⇒ (U,L) 1
(U,R) 0

Here, similarly as in the Stag Hunt game above, (D , L) is the only mutually
advantageous outcome relative to the two players’ threshold points — their
personal maximin payoff levels in the game. As such, the rank-based function
of team’s interests identifies its attainment as the objective for the team.
The deliberative process by which individual decision-makers may arrive
at this conclusion is described as follows. Thinking individualistically, both
players identify the two Nash equilibria in this game: (U , L) and (D , R). From
a personal point of view, the row player prefers the attainment of the outcome
(U , L). At the same time he or she recognizes the column player’s preference
for the attainment of the outcome (D , R). If both players were to pursue their
17Rankin et al. (2000) report an experiment in which different versions of the Stag Hunt
game are played repeatedly, but in a way that aims to induce one-shot reasoning of partici-
pating individuals in each round (by changing labels associated with the available actions and
varying sizes of payoffs resulting from different outcomes each time the game is played). In
this setting virtually everyone switches to playing S over time, which seems to support our
suggestion.
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preferred options, they would end up with the outcome (U , R), which is the
worst of all possible outcomes for both. The Nash equilibrium selection problem,
as previously, leaves them stuck with no further indication of what actions they
ought to perform independently from each other in order to best promote their
personal interests. At this stage they ask themselves “what would be best for
both of us in this situation?”. As soon as they do so, they identify the outcome
(D , L) as the uniquely rational solution of this game from the perspective of
team’s interests. Now, since the outcome (D , L) is not a Nash equilibrium
itself, they may each consider unilateral deviation from team play. However,
the previously recognized conflict of their personal interests associated with the
two Nash equilibria prevents them from doing so, emphasizing the outcome (D ,
L) as the only mutually advantageous solution of the game.
4.3.4 The Divide-the-Cake
Another interesting case involving multiple Nash equilibria is the Divide-the-
Cake game illustrated in Figure 6, which is a particularly simple version of the
well known Nash Bargaining game. In this game two players are presented
0 1 2 3 4
0 0, 0 0, 1 0, 2 0, 3 0, 4
1 1, 0 1, 1 1, 2 1, 3 0, 0
2 2, 0 2, 1 2, 2 0, 0 0, 0
3 3, 0 3, 1 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
4 4, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
Figure 6: The Dividing of a Cake game
with a cake that is cut into four equal-sized pieces and simultaneously place a
demand for the number of pieces for themselves (from 0 to 4 ). If the sum of
their demanded pieces does not exceed 4 , they both get what they asked for.
If, on the other hand, the sum exceeds 4 , they both get nothing. The game has
six Nash equilibria: (4 , 0 ), (3 , 1 ), (2 , 2 ), (1 , 3 ), (0 , 4 ) and an inefficient (4 ,
4 ). The row and the column players’ personal rankings of outcomes are shown
below.18
18There are 11 outcomes in total that yield a payoff of 0 to both players. For the sake of
brevity they are all represented by the outcome (0 , 0 ) in the two rankings.
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Row player:

(4 , 0 ) 4
(3 , 0 )(3 , 1 ) 3
(2 , 0 )(2 , 1 )(2 , 2 ) 2
(1 , 0 )(1 , 1 )(1 , 2 )(1 , 3 ) 1
⇒ (0 , 0 )(0 , 1 )(0 , 2 )(0 , 3 )(0 , 4 ) 0

Column player:

(0 , 4 ) 4
(0 , 3 )(1 , 3 ) 3
(0 , 2 )(1 , 2 )(2 , 2 ) 2
(0 , 1 )(1 , 1 )(2 , 1 )(3 , 1 ) 1
⇒ (0 , 0 )(1 , 0 )(2 , 0 )(3 , 0 )(4 , 0 ) 0

Here, relative to the two individuals’ maximin payoff levels, the outcome
(2 , 2 ) advances each player’s personal interests by 2 units. Since every other
outcome either advances one of the players’ personal interests by only 1 unit or
is not mutually advantageous (i.e. does not advance one of the players’ personal
interests at all) the rank-based function of team’s interests identifies the team’s
objective with the attainment of the outcome (2 , 2 ). This usually appeals to
most decision-makers and is supported by experimental results.19.
The above result is in line with Nash’s bargaining solution of this game.20
Misyak and Chater (2014) propose a theory of virtual bargaining as an alter-
native mode of reasoning that individuals may adopt when choosing among the
available outcomes and courses of actions in various types of games. According
to the proposed model the interacting decision-makers are said to be undergoing
implicit mental bargaining processes in an attempt to work out possible agree-
able outcomes in a somewhat similar fashion as it is done with the rank-based
function of team’s interests presented here. There are, however, some differences
between the two approaches.
First, the existing theories of bargaining generally rely on the existence of a
unique reference outcome that obtains when individuals fail to reach an agree-
ment following a bargaining process. In the Divide-the-Cake game this is as-
sumed to be the outcome in which both players gain nothing. In the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game this is usually the Nash equilibrium (D , D)—the outcome that
both players can fall back to in case of a failure of reaching an agreement with
regards to anything else. In most other cases that we address in this paper,
however, there is no such unique reference point. This does not pose a problem
for the proposed rank-based function of team’s interests, since its outputs are
determined not in relation to a unique reference outcome but by considering
multiple threshold points—one for each player in a game.
19See Nydegger and Owen (1974) for an experiment in which two players are asked to divide
$1 among themselves and virtually everybody agrees on a 50%-50% split. Note, however, that
for an odd number of slices the prescription of the rank-based function will not yield a unique
outcome. For example, in case of five slices the function selects three outcomes as optimal
for the team: (2 , 2 ), (3 , 2 ) and (2 , 3 ). We will discuss the indeterminacy of the rank-based
function in more detail later in the text.
20The fact that the predicted outcomes are the same in this particular example is a co-
incidence and the proposed rank-based function of team’s interests is more in line with the
bargaining solution presented by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975). Although the differences
and implications of the two bargaining models are interesting, we do not discuss them in more
detail here. For a discussion of Nash’s bargaining model see, for example, Luce and Raiffa
(1957, ch. 6).
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The second difference lies with the fact that Nash’s bargaining model (which
is presented as a possible starting point in the development of the theory of
virtual bargaining) does not entirely avoid the need to make interpersonal com-
parisons of individuals’ payoffs. This is because Nash’s solution requires the
interacting decision-makers’ payoff functions to be unique only up to positive
linear transformations and not positive affine transformations as we assume here.
This difference, however, can be overcome by adopting a different bargaining
model, such as the one presented by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975).21
4.3.5 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Recall the original and the amended Prisoner’s Dilemma games illustrated in
Figures 2(A) and 4(A) respectively. The row and the column players’ preferen-
tial rankings of the four outcomes and their personal maximin threshold points
(which are the same in both games) are shown below.
Row player:

(D,C) 3
(C,C) 2
⇒ (D,D) 1
(C,D) 0
 Column player:

(C,D) 3
(C,C) 2
⇒ (D,D) 1
(D,C) 0

The outcomes (C , D) and (D , C ) lie below one or the other player’s threshold
point. Hence their attainment is not viable in team play. Since (C , C ) is the
only outcome that advances both players’ personal interests relative to their
personal maximin payoff levels, it is identified as the unique solution of the
game from the perspective of team’s interests.
Even though this game has a unique Nash equilibrium, the motivation to
opt for a mutually beneficial outcome may prevail. This is because players
are aware of the fact that, if each of them pursues his or her personal goals
individualistically, they will end up at a suboptimal, Pareto inefficient outcome
(in the weak sense of Pareto efficiency). According to orthodox game theorists,
games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma are trivial, since they contain a unique
rational outcome in terms of individualistic reasoning. Many people outside
this field, however, feel that cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is not
unreasonable. We believe that the major source of controversy and disagreement
about this game may lie with the fact that some people tend to think about it
from the perspective of team’s interests.
It is possible to provide two interpretations of what happens when decision-
makers’ mode of reasoning undergoes a shift from individualistic to reasoning
as members of a team in this case. According to one interpretation, individuals
who reason as members of a team identify the uniquely rational outcome from
the perspective of team’s interests with other options no longer appearing to
21The underlying mechanism of the rank-based function of team’s interests is somewhat
similar to that behind the egalitarian solution to bargaining problems presented by Kalai
(1977) and Myerson (1977). The egalitarian solution is in line with the maximization of
the minimum advancement of players’ personal payoffs relative to a given reference point.
However, since it is concerned with equal advancement of players’ payoffs, the model is also
reliant on the interpersonal comparability of those payoffs.
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them as rational solutions of this game. According to another interpretation
and one that is in line with the deliberative processes we discussed in the pre-
ceding examples, individuals who reason as members of a team recognize the
existence of two rational solutions—one in terms of individualistic reasoning
and the other from the perspective of team’s interests. This leaves their chosen
courses of actions undetermined and rationalizable in two ways. It is only the
latter interpretation, however, that turns these games into genuine dilemmas for
the interacting decision-makers, since only those individuals who will identify in
such cases two distinct, differently rationalizable solutions will be puzzled about
how to proceed.
4.3.6 Preferential Rank Value vs. Normalized Payoff
In all examples discussed thus far the prescriptions of the rank-based function
are same for the two types of unit that can be used to measure the extent of
individual and mutual advantage provided by the different outcomes in games.
For an example of where these prescriptions differ consider the game illustrated
in Figure 7(A). This game has a unique Nash equilibrium: (D , R). The row
L R
U 9, 3 0, 2
M 8, 50 0, 2
D 10, 0 1, 1
A
L R
U 90, 6 0, 4
M 80, 100 0, 4
D 100, 0 10, 2
B
Figure 7: An example with different prescriptions for the two types of unit used
to measure the extent of individual and mutual advantage
and the column players’ preferential rankings of outcomes are shown below with
each player’s normalized payoffs given in parentheses. The same game using the
two players’ normalized payoffs is illustrated in Figure 7(B).
Row player:

(D,L) 4 (100)
(U,L) 3 (90)
(M,L) 2 (80)
⇒ (D,R) 1 (10)
(U,R)(M,R) 0 (0)

Column player:

(M,L) 4 (100)
(U,L) 3 (6)
(U,R)(M,R) 2 (4)
⇒ (D,R) 1 (2)
(D,L) 0 (0)

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The two mutually advantageous outcomes are (U , L) and (M , L). Using
the preferential rank value numbers 0 to 4, the outcome (U , L) advances both
players’ personal interests by 2 units. The outcome (M , L) advances the row and
the column players’ personal interests by 1 and 3 units respectively. The extent
of mutual advantage provided by the outcome (U , L) is 2 and that provided
by the outcome (M , L) is 1. As such, the approach that considers preferential
rank value numbers to measure the extent of individual and mutual advantage
selects the outcome (U , L) as optimal for the team.
It may seem, however, that the outcome (M , L) is in some sense better for
the team than the outcome (U , L). This is because the former results in the
row player attaining a payoff that is almost as good as the best possible payoff
to him or her in this game and the column player attaining a payoff that is far
better than any of the other five possibilities. This reasoning, however, is based
on the idea that payoff intervals between different pairs of outcomes convey
meaningful information about the players’ preferential intensities and can be
captured using normalized payoffs to measure the extent of mutual advantage
provided by the two outcomes. Using the normalized payoff values 0 to 100, the
outcome (U , L) advances the row and the column players’ personal interests by
80 and 4 units respectively. The outcome (M , L) does so by 70 and 98 units
respectively. The minimal advancement of personal interests across players as
well as the extent of mutual advantage provided by the outcome (U , L) is now
4 and that provided by the outcome (M , L)—70. As a result, the rank-based
function of team’s interests operationalized using normalized payoffs favours the
outcome (M , L).
4.4 Indeterminacy of the Rank-Based Function
It is not always the case that the proposed rank-based function yields a unique
solution to a group of individuals who are reasoning as members of a team.
For an example consider a version of the Chicken game illustrated in Figure 8.
As in the previous case, this game has two Nash equilibria: (U , L) and (D ,
L R
U 3, 2 0, 0
D 1, 1 2, 3
Figure 8: The Chicken game (version 2)
R). The row and the column players’ preferential rankings of outcomes and
their personal maximin threshold points are shown below with each player’s
normalized payoffs given in parentheses.
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Row player:

(U,L) 3 (100)
(D,R) 2 (66 2
3
)
⇒ (D,L) 1 (33 1
3
)
(U,R) 0 (0)
 Column player:

(D,R) 3 (100)
(U,L) 2 (66 2
3
)
⇒ (D,L) 1 (33 1
3
)
(U,R) 0 (0)

Using the preferential rank value numbers 0 to 3, the outcome (U , L) ad-
vances the row and the column players’ personal interests by 2 and 1 units
respectively. The outcome (D , R) does so by 1 and 2 units respectively. The
minimal advancement of personal interests across the two players as well as the
extent of mutual advantage that is provided by both outcomes is 1. Hence the
attainment of either one of these two outcomes remains a viable goal for a team.
(The same result obtains using the normalized payoff values 0 to 100.) As a
result, this game poses a coordination problem for individualistically reasoning
decision-makers as well as those who reason as members of a team and further
methods for resolving this game may be sought. We will briefly return to this
issue in the next section.
4.5 Normative vs. Descriptive Status
It may be asked whether the theory of team reasoning operationalized using
the proposed function of team’s interests is a normative or a descriptive theory
of choice in interdependent decision situations. The answer, in our view, is
somewhat mixed and depends largely on the type of decision problem individuals
face. We propose to classify games using the following four categories: [1]
games with multiple Nash equilibria, [2] games with a unique inefficient Nash
equilibrium (in the weak sense of Pareto efficiency) [3] games with a unique
efficient Nash equilibrium (in the weak sense of Pareto efficiency) and [4] games
with no Nash equilibria, where in all four categories we refer to Nash equilibria
in pure strategies alone.
In the case of category [1] — games with multiple Nash equilibria — we
suggest that the theory of team reasoning has a strong normative appeal and
that a shift in the interacting players’ mode of reasoning from individualistic to
that as members of a team is likely from the descriptive point of view as well.
Although individualistic best-response reasoning provides a number of rational
solutions, it does not resolve these games fully in terms of providing a definitive
course of actions for the decision-makers to take. The theory of team reason-
ing operationalized as above, however, suggests that best-response reasoning
is not the endpoint of rational deliberation and provides a rational resolution
of these games based on the notion of mutually advantageous advancement of
the interacting players’ personal interests. As such, if one agrees with the pro-
posed definition of mutual advantage and the suggested axioms to characterize
the interests of a team, the rank-based function of team’s interests provides a
normatively compelling basis for resolving these games. Whether the switch to
reasoning as a member of a team fully resolves such games, of course, depends
on whether the outcome selected by the function of team’s interests is unique.
This, as illustrated earlier, may not always be the case and other methods for
resolving such scenarios may be required. One possibility is a search for differ-
24
entiating features of the contemplated outcomes in order to single out one of
them for the sake of successful coordination of players’ actions. For example, if
the rank-based function identified three outcomes yielding payoff pairs (2, 2),
(2, 3) and (3, 2) as equally good for a team of two players22, the outcome (2, 2)
may be singled out due to its uniqueness. In many cases, however, a switch to
reasoning as a member of a team does resolve these games definitively and we
take this switch to be a natural progression in a player’s rational deliberative
process in an attempt to resolve such games when best-response reasoning fails
to do so.
In the case of category [2] the answer is less clear. These games have a
unique Nash equilibrium and, as such, individualistic best-response reasoning
resolves them fully. However, having identified the uniquely optimal outcomes
based on individualistic best-response reasoning, the interacting players may
easily recognize their unappealing inefficiencies. This, in turn, may prompt
them to identify mutually advantageous outcomes from the perspective of team’s
interests. From the descriptive point of view we expect this to happen often,
making such cases genuine dilemmas for the interacting decision-makers due to
the existence of multiple differently rationalizable resolutions of these games.
From the normative point of view, however, multiple courses of actions remain
possible: some based on the principles of best-response reasoning and others
based on those of mutually advantageous team play. As a result, a decision-
maker who has recognized both modes of reasoning in such games will have to
decide on which underlying principles to base his or her choice.
In the case of category [3] individualistic best-response reasoning resolves
these games fully and efficiently. As such, there is no need for team reasoning
to resolve these games efficiently and we do not expect people to reason as
members of a team from the descriptive point of view either.
Finally, in the case of category [4], similarly as was the case with category [1],
we suggest the theory of team reasoning to have a strong normative appeal, since
individualistic best-response reasoning provides no definitive solutions in these
games. In particular scenarios—those in which the function of team’s interests
is able to identify uniquely rational solutions—we also expect a shift in decision-
makers’ mode of reasoning to provide a descriptively accurate explanation of the
chosen courses of action.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we argued against the operationalization of the theory of team rea-
soning with the use of the maximization of the average of individuals’ personal
payoffs as a representation of team’s interests. Our arguments focused on its
reliance on making interpersonal comparisons of the interacting players’ payoffs
and a possible advocacy of a complete sacrifice of some individuals’ personal
interests for the benefit of others. While only a subset of the existing texts on
the theory of team reasoning make a reference to the maximization of average
22See earlier footnote 19 for an example where this may be the case.
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payoffs, most of the remaining literature in this field does not endorse a specific
function and instead focuses on specifying a number of general conditions for a
candidate function of team’s interests to satisfy. We attempted to fill this gap
by proposing a rank-based function of team’s interests as a possible alternative
that is in line with the orthodox conception of payoffs and is based on the notion
of mutual advantage in team play that is compatible with the idea suggested
by Sugden (2011, 2015). We extended the notion of mutual benefit by present-
ing a measure of the extent of individual and mutual advantage provided by
the available outcomes to the interacting players in games and axiomatized the
formal representation of team’s interests.
While the proposed rank-based function of team’s interests fits with some
experimental findings from games discussed in this paper, further empirical tests
will need to be constructed to test this model’s empirical validity. In principle
this task is possible, since the rank-based function of team’s interests provides
testable predictions in many games.
The second area requiring further research concerns cases where the pro-
posed rank-based function of team’s interests does not yield a unique solution.
Bardsley et al. (2010) consider possible scenarios where the Pareto efficiency cri-
terion may be abandoned in such cases. An example is the Enlarged Hi-Lo game
illustrated in Figure 9. In this game the rank-based function identifies team’s
Hi 1 Hi 2 Lo
Hi 1 10, 10 0, 0 0, 0
Hi 2 0, 0 10, 10 0, 0
Lo 0, 0 0, 0 9, 9
Figure 9: The Enlarged Hi-Lo game
interests with the attainment of outcomes (Hi 1 , Hi 1 ) or (Hi 2 , Hi 2 ) but
does not discriminate further among the two. One way to proceed for a team in
this case is to abandon the Pareto efficiency criterion and instead focus on the
attainment of the outcome (Lo, Lo) for the sake of successful coordination of
players’ actions. This suggests that the function of team’s interests may need to
be developed further to account for such scenarios. Another possibility, however,
is to separate the question of which outcomes in a considered game are the best
from the point of view of mutually advantageous team play from the question
of how to coordinate players’ actions having identified the best outcomes. From
this point of view, the Enlarged Hi-Lo game could be seen to have three rational
solutions in terms of individualistic reasoning and two rational solutions in terms
of mutually advantageous team play. This could prompt the decision-makers
to seek further methods for coordinating their actions among the team-optimal
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outcomes first and, if no coordination was possible among these, revert back
to considering outcomes that were suboptimal from the perspective of team’s
interests—such as the outcome (Lo, Lo) in the above example—to seek possible
coordination among those.
Finally, the exact ways by which the interacting individuals arrive at the
conclusions predicted by the rank-based function of team’s interests depend on
what is responsible for triggering shifts in people’s mode of reasoning from indi-
vidualistic to reasoning as members of a team and vice versa. While we did not
discuss the various accounts addressing this question in the existing literature,
we presented a possible suggestion according to which a shift in individuals’
mode of reasoning may come about as a result of extended reasoning in games
by otherwise individualistically rational agents. Further research into this possi-
bility would allow to bridge the gap between the two modes of reasoning within
the framework of non-cooperative game theory.
Appendix A
We here show that the rank-based function of team’s interests presented above
satisfies the four axioms introduced in section 4. Proofs presented below are tai-
lored to the case where the extent of individual and mutual advantage provided
by different outcomes to the interacting players in games is measured using pref-
erential rank values discussed on page 13. For a version of these proofs where
the extent of both types of advantage is measured using normalized payoffs
discussed on page 16, all instances of ℘i(·) need to be replaced with u∗i (·).
Axiom 1 (Weak Pareto optimality): If an outcome y of a game is strictly
preferred to some other outcome x by all players, then the outcome x is not
chosen by the team.
Suppose that an outcome selected by the rank-based function of team’s interests
does not satisfy this axiom. In other words, suppose that some outcome x is
selected by a team when some other outcome y is strictly preferred to x by all
players. Following the notation introduced in section 4.1, let the two outcomes x
and y be defined as strategy profiles sx, sy ∈ Σ respectively. Since sy is strictly
preferred to sx by every player i ∈ I, it is the case that (i) for every player i ∈ I,
℘i(s
y) > ℘i(s
x), where ℘i(s) is player i’s preferential rank value associated with
the strategy profile s ∈ Σ.
By Axiom 2, any outcome that is selected by a team is, for every player, at
least as good as the outcome associated with his or her personal maximin payoff
level in the game. This means that (ii) for every player i ∈ I, ℘i(sx) ≥ ℘i(sYi).
Combining (i) and (ii) gives
min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
y)− ℘i(sYi)
]
> min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
x)− ℘i(sYi)
]
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Hence,
sx /∈ arg max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]} :=
{sτ | ∀s ∈ Σ : min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
] ≤ min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
τ )− ℘i(sYi)
]}
and so sx /∈ Στ .
Axiom 2 (Preservation of personal security): Team play cannot leave any
player worse-off than his or her personal maximin payoff level in a game.
Let sYi ∈ Si be player i’s maximin (pure) strategy in a game. Let sY =
(sY1 , . . . , s
Y
m) be a strategy profile where each player i ∈ I plays his or her
maximin (pure) strategy sYi ∈ Si. Every player preferentially ranks all strategy
profiles that are associated with his or her maximin strategy at least as high
as the strategy profile(s) associated with his or her maximin payoff level in the
game. As such, for every player i ∈ I, ℘i(sY) ≥ ℘i(sYi) (recall that sYi is a
strategy profile that is associated with player i ’s maximin payoff level in the
game). Since the strategy profile sY ∈ Σ exists in every game, it follows that
max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]} ≥ 0
Therefore, if a strategy profile sx is such that, for some player i ∈ I, ℘i(sx) <
℘i(s
Yi), then
sx /∈ arg max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]} :=
{sτ | ∀s ∈ Σ : min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
] ≤ min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
τ )− ℘i(sYi)
]}
and so sx /∈ Στ .
Axiom 3 (Maximal mutual advantage): An outcome selected by a team
has to be maximally mutually advantageous.
The extent of individual advantage provided by a strategy profile s ∈ Σ to a
particular player i ∈ I is given by ℘i(s) − ℘i(sYi). Let d(s) denote the extent
of mutual advantage provided by the strategy profile s ∈ Σ to the interacting
players. Since the extent of mutual advantage is given by the number of units the
strategy profile s ∈ Σ advances all players’ personal interests in parallel relative
to the strategy profile(s) associated with each player’s personal maximin payoff
level in the game,
d(s) = min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]
and it is the case that, for every player i ∈ I, ℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi) ≥ d(s).
Suppose that some strategy profile sx ∈ Σ is selected by a team that is not
maximally mutually advantageous. In other words, there exists another strategy
profile sy ∈ Σ such that d(sy) > d(sx). It then follows from the above that
min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
y)− ℘i(sYi)
]
> min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
x)− ℘i(sYi)
]
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Hence
sx /∈ arg max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]} :=
{sτ | ∀s ∈ Σ : min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
] ≤ min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
τ )− ℘i(sYi)
]}
and so sx /∈ Στ .
Axiom 4 (Indifference between equal extent of mutual advantage): If
some outcome x is in a team’s choice set and some other outcome y provides
the same extent of mutual advantage as x, then y is in the team’s choice set as
well.
Suppose that some strategy profile sx ∈ Σ is selected by a team and that some
other strategy profile sy ∈ Σ provides the same extent of mutual advantage to
the interacting players as the strategy profile sx. This means that d(sy) = d(sx)
and that
min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
y)− ℘i(sYi)
]
= min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
x)− ℘i(sYi)
]
Since sx is selected by the team,
sx ∈ Στ ≡ arg max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]} :=
{sτ | ∀s ∈ Σ : min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
] ≤ min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
τ )− ℘i(sYi)
]}
From above it follows that sy ∈ Στ as well.
Appendix B
We here show that the presented rank-based function of team’s interests is
unique in satisfying the Axioms 1-4 introduced above. As in Appendix A,
the discussion below is tailored to the case where the extent of individual and
mutual advantage provided by different outcomes to the interacting players in
games is measured using preferential rank values discussed on page 13. For a
version of this proof where the extent of both types of advantage is measured
using normalized payoffs discussed on page 16, all instances of ℘i(·) need to be
replaced with u∗i (·).
Suppose that some function Gτ (Σ) = Στ selects a subset from the set of all
strategy profiles of the game Γ in a way that satisfies the Axioms 1-4 introduced
above. From the definitions of individual and mutual advantage it follows that
the extent of mutual advantage provided to the interacting players by some
strategy profile s ∈ Σ in a game is the least extent of individual advantage
provided by that strategy profile across players and is given by
d(s) = min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]
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(see the first paragraph of proof for Axiom 3 in Appendix A and the notation
introduced in section 4.1). By Axiom 3, any strategy profile sτ ∈ Στ selected
by a team has to be maximally mutually advantageous, which means that the
following condition must hold:
∀s ∈ Σ : min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
τ )− ℘i(sYi)
] ≥ min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]
This can be rewritten as
sτ ∈ arg max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]} :=
{sτ | ∀s ∈ Σ : min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
] ≤ min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
τ )− ℘i(sYi)
]}
Suppose that some strategy profile sx ∈ Σ is selected by a team: sx ∈ Στ .
From above,
sx ∈ arg max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]}
For any other strategy profile sy ∈ Σ that provides the same extent of mutual
advantage to the interacting players as the strategy profile sx, d(sy) = d(sx),
or, equivalently,
min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
y)− ℘i(sYi)
]
= min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
x)− ℘i(sYi)
]
From this combined with the above it follows that
sy ∈ arg max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]}
Conversely, for any other strategy profile sz ∈ Σ that belongs to the set
arg max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]}
it is the case that
min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
z)− ℘i(sYi)
]
= min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
x)− ℘i(sYi)
]
which means that the strategy profile sz provides the same extent of mutual
advantage to the interacting players as the strategy profile sx.
By Axiom 4, any strategy profile that provides the same extent of mutual
advantage to the interacting players as the strategy profile sx ∈ Στ , or, equiva-
lently, any strategy profile that belongs to the set
arg max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]}
is in the team’s choice set and, hence,
Στ ≡ arg max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]}
and Gτ ≡ Fτ .
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